Media, Securitization, and the War on Terrorism: Comparing Bush's Speech Frames in US, Canadian, and European News Reports

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Constructivist theories of securitization are built on a foundation of communicative action tenets. While this represents an important and innovative advance in international relations theory, securitization ignores some of the components involved in a successful communicative act. Williams (2003) calls for securitization theory to incorporate the hitherto ignored effects of mass media and in this paper we answer this call. We first show that securitization's specification of leaders' speech acts and audiences' legitimative discourse presumes mass media actors are indifferent in how they convey leader representations and justifications of crises. We take this presumption as an empirical question and execute a study of whether the national presses of ally countries differently emphasized the frames Bush invoked in their news coverage of key September 11th speeches. We show from comparisons of chi-square distributions and regression analyses that, far from being passive conveyers of speech frames, the national presses of the US, Canada, France, Britain and Ireland (1) did not convey all of Bush's securitizing problem representations and response justifications proportionate to the extent Bush invoked them in his speeches, and (2) that for each national press factors based on professional norms and/or organizational routines increased the likelihood that a speech sentence would be conveyed in a news story. We discuss the implications of our findings for how securitization theory should conceptualize media actors when redressing this gap in its explanatory models.

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All leaders face constraints that affect how they choose to respond to foreign policy crises. Leaders of democratic states face the additional burdens of cultivating domestic popular support. Crises differ in magnitude, with some requiring ally support, which means that leaders must persuade not only their domestic public, but foreign publics as well. News stories and analyses will mediate the process of leader persuasion of mass publics, making the media a force in its own right in international relations and foreign policy processes (Boynton and Beer, 2002; Page, 2000, Edwards and Wood, 1999; Wood and Peak, 1998; Wolfsfeld, 1997; 2001; Powlick and Katz, 1998; Allen, et al. 1994; Bennett and Manheim, 1993; Brody, 1991; Russett, 1990; Russett and Graham, 1989).[1]

On September 11, 2001 an avowedly isolationist United States president with an approximately 50% approval rating, possessing fewer rhetorical skills than his recent predecessors and, arguably, less foreign policy knowledge, confronted an event of massive destruction and loss of life. President Bush faced the need to explain to American and world publics the nature of the problem and the appropriateness of his administration's response to this unique event.

Several editorials in the international elite press raised the urgency and significance for Bush to successfully handle this communicative task. In an op-ed piece that appeared in both the Washington Post and the Irish Times, freelance foreign correspondent Anne Applebaum argued

> It is time for America's leaders to start building widespread, active support
> for whatever action we take, in as public a manner as possible. It is not enough to
> build coalitions with diplomacy, nor enough to call on NATO leaders for support,
> as Bush has done: The president should also go over the heads of the statesmen,
> and speak to the foreign public....For strange though it may seem to Americans,
> George Bush is the leader of ...global civilization as well as president of the
> United States. His every word is being repeated and analyzed in Europe's capitals
> with just as much attention as in Washington and New York....If he appeals to the
> citizenry of the international community, his constituents – all of his constituents
> – will hear him" (Washington Post, 9/16/01, p. B03).

Applebaum's op-ed typified media calls for Bush to "go public" both domestically and globally, and the importance of doing so successfully. What we find interesting, and make the empirical centerpiece of this study, are her assumptions that "his every word is being repeated" and that "in European capitals with as much attention as in Washington and New York" as well as "if he appeals...all of his constituents will hear him."

Is Applebaum's central assertion true – that not only the American press but the European presses faithfully conveyed and repeated a US President's words, at least during one

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[1] An example of the widespread scholarly acknowledgement of the media as an actor in international relations can be found in the 2000 chartering and robust membership growth of the International Communication section of the International Studies Association.

important international event? If this is truly the case, then the implications are astonishing. If her assertion is correct, this suggests that the American President's words – and by implication ideas and world view – do not merely contribute to but dominate US political discourse as well as European political discourse. In this paper we ask and empirically test the extent to which US and select foreign presses actually did convey problem definition and and response justification frames from Bush's first public statements to the September 11th crisis. Of central substantive interest here is whether different frames were emphasized in US, Canadian, Quebec, French, British and Irish news story coverage. We compare these countries' papers because of their past historical cultural affinity and/or cultural alliances with the US. Our choice of these countries' papers coverage of Bush's response to an extraordinary event in world history amounts to a critical case.

Applebaum may be correct. The September 11th attacks were indeed unique: attacks of such magnitude against not only civilian targets but also against symbols of American strength had not occurred since the British burned the White House during the War of 1812. Perhaps the September 11th attacks were a watershed that resulted in a US president being able to become not only the embodiment of the nation's image but were an event that allowed him to make a genuinely sympathetic and grieving global public audience his own.

On the other hand, this may not have been the case. European news outlets may have extensively broadcasted or printed some of George W. Bush's statements, but not necessarily all of them. Recent work by Frensley and Ayres (2000), Frensley (2001) and Frensley and Ayres (2002) on selective media conveyance framing support this line of conjecture. These studies show that reporters are attentive to some presidential frames but not others and that this affects the content of their news stories. The September 11th attacks created an extraordinary and unique crisis. However, that crisis neither changed foreign news reporter's cognitive processes nor the professional heuristics they use in deciding what to include and leave out in writing their news stories.

One of the media's major functions is to report on the actions and statements of political leaders. In carrying out this function, the media provide a linkage between leadership and wider society. Through such linkage, questions about communications mediums and media actors become relevant to earlier, multi-level theories of international relations – whether descended from realism or liberalism – that assume or address domestic unity. However, in remaining silent about the role of the media, these theories by default treat the media as actor indifferent to international relations and foreign policy even at the same time that they convey leaders' representations of the crises their responses address. Examples of this abound across both realist and liberal approaches (Frensley and Ayres, 2000). Morgenthau (1967) argues the necessity for leaders to shape public opinion, but does not discuss how. George (1980) observes that presidents face the necessity of justifying their policies to legislators and to the public, but does not explain the mechanisms or difficulties in doing so. Lebow (1981) and Doyle (1983a; 1983b; 1986) both argue that public opinion is a foreign policy constraint, but do not discuss how leaders modify or communicate with that constraint through a mass medium. Putnam's (1988) two-level games framework, with its explicit focus on domestic bargaining, does not take into account that that interactions between leader and constituents will be mediated while stressing the importance of national unity as a key resource for bargaining leaders. More recently, Mintz's

poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making has informed many studies demonstrating that leaders' foreign policy choices bear heavily on avoiding electoral loss but ignore the media as an actor that can attenuate or diminish this risk – possibilities in which studies of media framing and endorsement effects show the media can play a powerful role. These varied approaches are similar not only in asserting domestic support as a constraint or a resource but also in that their research questions treat actors' motivations as a given: actors are motivated to maximize a priori objective interests, whether they are national interests, domestic interests, or a balance of the two.

Another international relations approach is constructivism. Constructivism differs from these theories in that its central problematic is how actors' motivations evolve as the outcome of a social process, rather than taking them as a priori givens. In other words, where interest-based approaches to international relations presuppose interactions are conditioned by existing behavioral norms, constructivists treat actors as redefining, or constructing behavioral norms through their (inter)actions. This latter social constructivist epistemology is one shared with communicative action theory. It is not surprising, then, to see different constructivist theories focus on concepts developed by communication action theorists such as speech acts, argumentative rationality, and discursive legitimation (which we describe below). What is surprising, however, is seeing that constructivist theories – as political theories rooted in concepts of communicative action – have also ignored mass communications actors and communication mediums in discussions of linkage between leaderships and mass publics. More than surprising, we find that this lack of attention to the process of leader-societal linkage stymies constructivism's ability to develop beyond producing descriptive treatments and criticisms of interest-based IR theories. Securitization theorists have only very recently called for exploring the role of the media in the development of this research program (Williams, 2003). Responding to this call motivates our present study.

Our empirical question, whether the national presses of ally countries differently emphasized the frames Bush invoked in their news coverage of key September 11th speeches, amounts to a key test of securitization theory's default position that media outlets largely perform an undifferentiated conveyance of leaders' representations of security crisis and response justifications. As a test of this position, our findings have implications for how securitization can thematize and incorporate mass media behavior into models that empirically explore processes of linkage.

To carry out this research we first apply a research design developed by Frensley (2002). Following that research design, for this study we content analyzed and coded key post-9/11 speech sentences according to the frame each invoked or was associated. Second, we compiled datasets on which of the speech sentences were recounted in news stories from national presses (the New York Times (USA), The Globe & Mail (Canada), Le Monde (France), The London Times (UK), and the Irish Times).

We carry out descriptive statistics to determine differences in proportions between the frame codes of sentences in Bush's speeches with the proportions of frame codes of sentences recounted in these five national papers' news stories. After testing for proportionality differences, we use OLS regressions to estimate the independent effects of each frame, as well as

media practice factors and other controls, on the extent to which a given newspaper would recount a given sentence from Bush's speeches. We estimate models for each paper and compare the patterns of significance and direction of effect across the five papers.

The next section situates this study in securitization and media and foreign policy studies, discussing how it builds on earlier empirical work and how identifies issues securitization must engage in order to extend theorizing into empirically grounded studies of linkage. After presenting the research design and discussing data and coding issues for presidential frame variables, media practice variables, and measurement of media recounting, the statistical procedures are discussed, followed by a presentation of the results. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for securitization theory.

Communication, Journalists and Securitization Constructivists

A successful communication act involves several components, including the speaker, the message, the medium, and the audience (Campbell, 1996). In this section we explain how securitization theory engages speaker, message and audience but ignores medium, the implications of doing so, and what securitization must consider about media actors in extending theories that accommodate their roles in representing security.

Securitization theory treats a security question not as an exclusive matter of objective fact but as the result of a process of social construction of an event as a security issue. In other words, a security question does not exist by itself; it is the fruit of a common perception built around representations of it as such that are propagated to the polity. Indeed, such common perception is rarely sui generis, and more often results from the messages the society receives about the threat it faces. As Williams notes: "the social construction of security issues (who or what is secured, and from what) is analyzed by examining the "securitizing speech-acts" through which threats become represented and recognized. Issues become "securitized", treated as security issues, through these speech acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such" (2003:513).

In order for this speech act to be efficient, two conditions have to be met. First, grammatical-linguistic rules must be followed and then, the actor who wishes to securitize an issue must be in a legitimate position to do so. Alongside meeting the conditions for the successful speech act, Buzan, et al. (1998) contend that three other features are associated with a successful securitization: the presence of (1) existential threats that require the taking of (2) emergency action (which is justified by the contents of the speech act), with the attendant consequences of (3) breaking away from behavioural norms and rules in ways that have effects on interunit relations.

Is the post September 11th "war on terrorism" such a securitization? The question might be argued, but for the purpose of this study, we will consider it as such. Past, present and future threats were made good when two towers were turned into dust, a wall of the Pentagon was eviscerated, a field in Pennsylvania was ploughed, and thousand of innocent lives were taken. These objective facts satisfy the existential threat condition. The terror = war construction, which we discuss fully below, was used to justify and privilege military responses, federal law

enforcement diminishment of state-level law enforcement autonomy in information-sharing and cooperation, and Patriot Act corrosion of constitutional rights and liberties. Regardless of whether these administration actions were appropriate responses, their unusual nature satisfies the emergency action requirement for a successful securitization. The September 11th responses in which Bush asserted that the US would lead the war on terrorism, and constructed the war on terrorism as a world war where no state could be neutral situated the US not only as coordinating ally response but doing so in ways in which allies were not equal partners. For example, in declaring the war on terrorism to be a world war with no neutral states, Bush's statements implied that it would judge whether a nation was neutral or not. This sharply unilateral view of the world was a break with America's earlier post-Cold War era responses to major crisis. The elder President Bush made it a point of publicly stressing coalition cooperation, consultation and coordination and sought the legitimacy of United Nations Security Council resolutions as part of the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. President Clinton publicly stressed the need for NATO cooperation and coordination. While US was clearly the "heavy lifter" in the Gulf and Kosovo crises both in leading the coalitions and providing troops, how Bush elder and Clinton publicly regarded cooperating countries invoked multilateral, rather than unilateral norms. That George W. Bush did not partially satisfied the third condition of breaking away from behavioural rules and norms. Subsequent critical reactions by Germany, France, Canada, and other others provided sufficiency for meeting the auxiliary condition of broken norms having effects on interunit relations.

Securitization theory has been criticized for propounding a mode of analysis that can be used for treating demagogic, instrumental speech acts on the same footing as reason-based, legitimate speech acts. As Williams puts it, "[M]any ... ask whether despite its avowedly 'constructivist' view of security practices, securitization theory is implicitly committed to a methodological objectivism that is politically irresponsible and lacking in any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity, and emergency" (2003: 521). Securitization overcomes this ethical charge by linking audience-based discursive ethics to evaluations of the legitimacy of speech acts. Discursive legitimation draws from, among others, the theorizing of Jurgen Habermas (1984). At its most basic, discursive legitimacy is achieved when a social decision is consistent with various public discourses (audience). With the addition of societal audience to an efficient speech act (speaker and message), the former achieves legitimacy by surviving rigorous debate and argument within the latter.

Williams (2003: 523) applies this to securitizations:

> [a]s speech acts, securitizations are in principle forced to enter the realm of
> discursive legitimation ... [because it] entails the possibility of argument, of
> dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of security
> perceptions both within and between states. The securitizing speech act must be
> accepted by the audience, and while the Copenhagen School is careful to note that
> '[a]ccept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it
> only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent,' it is
> nonetheless the case that [s]ince securitization can never only be imposed, there is
> some need to argue one's case' (Buzan, et al., 1998: 23), and that [s]uccessful
> securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security
> speech act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a

shared value? Thus security (as with all politics) untimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects' (1998: 31).

However, for rigorous debate and argument to take place, the audience must be aware of the all the representations the speaker makes in attempting to constitute the securitization. In large, complex societies, the audience will secure its information and basis for evaluating the representations via a mass communications medium. Williams (2003: 524-528) recognizes this as a key challenge for securitization theory, calling for "broader techniques for 'reading' the rhetorics of securitizing acts, techniques attuned to the rhetorics of visual representation and reception, and their contextual aspects" (527). We applaud Williams' insights on the importance of adding mass communications considerations to the securitization program. We could not more agree that if the audience to serve as a legitimacy regulator for leaders' securitization attempts there must be no obstacle to full information about the speech act. In the absence of securitization theory addressing mass media questions, this means that media accounts of the speech act must be assumed to be complete, in the sense of mirroring representations the speaker makes. However, simply acknowledging and describing mass media images and accounts will gain securitization no leverage in understanding the role the media plays in the legitimation process of securitizing speech acts. To achieve this, as Martin Shaw argues, the media has to be treated not only as structure but also as agent:

> What is at stake is more than adding media as a significant category of "actor" alongside states and other nonstate actors. The idea of the media as a single, powerful agent - whether a faithful servant of state and corporate interests (as radicals sometimes allege) or an intruder into their realms (as statesmen sometimes complain) - is the bane of serious discussion, indicating that we have not even started a meaningful analysis. What is needed is a complex conceptualization of media as both structure and agency" (p. 29).

Shaw's argument is important, because it suggests that to fully understand the media's role in securitization legitimation requires consideration not only of the images and accounts it provides but also of the production of those images and accounts.

The Media and Foreign Policy Context of the Empirical Question

The international communications field is motivated by several questions of central interest to international relations scholars; one that has particularly focused inquiry is the question of how media coverage shapes and constrains the terrain of political discourse about foreign policy crisis.

The scope and topics of any type of discourse, be it political or mundane, is the result of whether (1) an actor is able to contribute statements about their positions and (2) whether a contributing actor is able to make statements about all of their positions. In political discourse mediated by news organizations, such as communication between presidents and mass audiences, questions about whether and under what circumstances the media will report viewpoints critical of the administration's foreign policy positions have generated many studies. This line of inquiry focuses on how the media evaluate administration positions, either by

examining whether reporters make disproportionate use of administration sources in their news stories. For example, scholars show that media critically evaluate administration positions using the range of viewpoints raised in interelite debate as a type of "index" (Bennett, 1990; Zaller and Chiu, 1996). Other scholars argue that reporters privilege sources whose information they believe is a bellwether that can forecast or shape future events (Entman and Page, 1994). This line of evaluative inquiry also focuses on the circumstances when reporters will critically evaluate administration policy. Mermin (1999) reports that the media coverage becomes critical of policy when the crisis leaves the establishment phase and enters the response implementation phase.

Both evaluative lines of inquiry emphasize the extent to which the media are including or excluding non-administration or critical viewpoints. However, what studies of media evaluation do not address is the second condition affecting the parameters of political discourse, which results in ignoring the question of whether reporters report the complete range of the administration's viewpoints that they privilege in their news stories during the establishment phase of a crisis. In laymen's terms, these studies cannot tell us if the media become selectively deaf when the president speaks and why; they can tell us only what they heard to supportively or critically evaluate. To fully understand the presidential communicative and mass public interplay in leader-public linkage during foreign policy crises we must answer both questions.

These two questions are related since much of what source's statements and reporters critically or supportively target, are statements made by the president. These two questions are also different, since much of the time, out of the population of president's statements, sources comment on or reporters evaluate are those statements reporters sampled by deeming them newsworthy to report. To continue the sampling metaphor, when reporters make judgments about what of a president's speech to include in news stories, does the corpus of news stories produce biased or representative samples of what the president actually said? The media affects the president's contributions to the parameters of possible political discourse by making salient, through repetition, what the president said. The media does this by running stories that (1) cover these addresses and straightforwardly report what the president said, and/or (2) cover reactions to the contents of these speeches and refer to what the president said, and/or (3) analyze the implications of policy statements in these speeches and refer to what the president said, and/or (4) analyzing the implications of giving a speech that was well-received or not for presidential support and success in mobilizing support for his issue positions.

The notion of testing if presidential framing of statements affects whether the media are likely to convey those statements amounts to a type of agenda-setting study. Media agenda setting explore the effects of varying news attention to different policy issues on governmental and public opinion problem prioritization. In foreign policy studies that focus on government behavior, scholars have shown the effects of a donor country's media coverage of a recipient country on foreign aid allocations to that country (Van Belle, 1999; Van Belle and Hook, 2000) and the effects of media coverage on policy substitution in internal conflict intervention (Regan, 2000). In one of the earliest book-length studies of media and foreign policy, Cohen (1963) made the point that the media shape the public's awareness of foreign policy issues. He observed that the press may not always be successful in telling people what to think, "but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think about" (p. 13, emphasis in the original).

These studies cast the media as an independent variable whose behavior affects other actors, be they foreign policy bureaucrats decisions or the mass public's attitudes and opinions. This paper applies Frensley's (2002) related notion of selective media frame conveyance, which is indebted to these earlier studies. While related to agenda-setting research in media and foreign policy studies, selective media conveyance differs conceptually in its treatment of the nature of media foreign crisis reporting as a <u>dependent</u> variable affected by speaker(s) framing of their policy statements interacting with news production conventions that reporters follow to gather news. As such, it regards reporters both as consumers of problem representing and response justifying frames and as newsworkers following their profession's norms, objectives, and procedures for determining what is newsworthy.

In the following section we discuss how we operationally apply selective media frame conveyance to understanding how different national presses covered Bush's securitizing representations of the September 11th attacks and the US response.

<u>Data and Methods</u>

<u>Bush's September 11th Crisis Frames</u>

Speakers use a variety of means to facilitate understanding of their ideas, including symbols and invocations of cultural frames. A frame is simply the highlighting and presenting some informational aspects or arguments about an issue to promote a particular "problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman, 1993: p. 52). Frames allow audiences to distill the many words speakers use into a few meaningful categories of understandable ideas. Since frames are categories, if one can find a valid way to identify those categories, researchers can use frames to compare systematically speaker's ideas and arguments and the words and sentences used to communicate them. If the speaker is a political leader who must use a mass medium to appeal to different, multiple audiences, researchers can use frames to systematically assess leaders' ideas the media tend to selectively report or ignore.

Answering the question of what frames the Bush administration created and invoked in response to the September 11th crisis becomes a matter of devising an appropriate research design for cataloguing the President's communication attempts with the public. This study applies a research design developed for an earlier study that showed New York Times reporters were significantly selective about which international and domestic frames they recounted in news stories referencing Bush's post 9/11 speeches (Frensley, 2002).

The first research design issue centers on identifying sources of frames. We target national addresses that the White House announced in advance. Our expectation was that reporters would be particularly attentive to those the American public knew and anticipated rather than to communications made with less advance notice. Moreover, these were speeches made directly after 9/11, in which the securitization's problem representations and response justifications were invoked for the first time. It is likely that White House speechwriters, President Bush, and his advisors would have carefully written these speeches knowing they were invoking these frames for the first time. A second consideration is the timing of the addresses.

National addresses were restricted to September and October only because of the appearance of the anthrax threat early in November. While questions about how the Bush administration framed the anthrax threat are themselves worthy topics for scholarly inquiry, the anthrax infections were never directly linked to Al-Qaida and the events of September 11th, our substantive topic of interest. The four post-September 11th national addresses content-analyzed to uncover Bush's crisis frames are:

(1) The September 11th Address to the Nation
(2) The September 14th Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance,
(3) The September 20th Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, and
(4) The October 7th Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al-Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan.

These national addresses were televised live and unedited to the American public.

One possible objection to not only the research design but also to calls for securitization theory to explicitly address the role of the media in public legitimations of securitizing speech acts is that presidents can always trump the media by speaking directly to the public. This, however, is a weak argument for several reasons. Most presidents are interested in reaching larger audiences than the numbers of people that can hear them in person. Large numbers of people simply do not or cannot watch presidential speeches or news conferences when broadcast. Instead, they watch news clips on local news programs or read what the press reports the president said. For those that do watch the live speech or conference that becomes a news event in itself, some of its features, but not all, will be repeated in follow-on analyses by opponents and expert commentators that are carried by the media or by journalist themselves commenting. In short, it is inevitable that presidential attempts at going public will be mediated (Smith, 1990; Cook, 1997).

The second issue involved identifying the frame unit of measure. Some framing studies identify the frame for a whole text, a certain part of the text (e.g., lead paragraph of a news story, headline, Vanderbilt archive news story abstract), or a paragraph. In this study, the frame unit of measure is the sentence. The reason for making the sentence the unit is recognition of the fact that leaders' rhetorical styles will differ. Several observers have commented on the pronounced brevity of George W. Bush's speeches; this was evident during the 2000 presidential campaign and even in his inaugural address – which broke the shortness record by clocking in at eighteen minutes. One reason for Bush's speech brevity is that Bush's publicly-disclosed arguments tend to be short, blunt, and simple. Bush's argument structure does not take the form of a claim warranted by reasons; rather, the tendency is for each sentence to be a claim.[2] For George W.

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[2] In comparison, former President Bill Clinton made lengthier speeches in which the argument structure did take the claim-justification format. The two styles could not be more different: Bush's policy speeches more closely resemble a sermon-like speech structure whereas Clinton's policy speeches more closely resembled the forensic argument structure used by debaters. In earlier studies of selective media frame conveyance of presidential statements about the Gulf War and the Kosovo crisis, Bush elder's and Clinton's styles were treated as forensic and as a consequence a different unit of analysis, the decision statement, was used (2000; 2001; 2003).

Bush's speaking style, the sentence is the most reasonable unit of measure. This unit of measure produces 324 observations across the four speeches.

The third issue involved identifying the frames themselves. Since after the attacks Bush faced the twin necessities of both reassuring a domestic constituency and announcing internationally what the US response would be, the first sorting exercise involved the first author and a colleague sorting the sentences into international and domestic reference categories. Two types of statements stood out as possibly spanning both: statements involving Congress and the US military. These statements were coded separately as Other categories, which also included those statements that could not be unambiguously sorted into domestic or international categories. The Other category consisted of 15 sentences, which amounts to 4.6 % of the total 324 sentences. The domestic reference sentences amounted to 167 sentences, or 51.54 %.

The second turn in the sorting exercise involved sorting the international reference sentences into problem definition versus response categories. Table 1 summarizes the international frames discussed below and offers examples from each speech.

Table 1 about here.

In studies of conflict and conflict resolution scholars have identified significant concepts that allow us to better understand and analyze conflict processes. Combatant grievance (in other words, conflict motive) is one of the most important elements for understanding conflict. Bush characterized the terrorists as motivated by their hatred of freedom and/or democracy in 10 (9.09 %) of the 110 total international reference sentences [FREEDOM]. Bush established the motive frame in the first sentence of September 11th speech when he told the nation "Today our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts." This frame was reinforced in seconds when Bush explained nine sentences later that "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world."

Another important element for understanding conflict processes is whether the issues of combatant contention are consensual, where the combatants can at least agree that the issues in dispute make sense to both, or if they are dissensual, in which the combatants cannot understand the reasons for each others' grievances. In 12 sentences (10.9 %), Bush characterized the ideational clash as dissensual, as having no middle ground and being one of moral absolutes because it was a struggle between good and evil; alternatively, as a struggle between progressive and traditional visions of society [MORAL ABSOLUTISM]. Bush established the moral absolutism frame immediately after establishing the motive frame when he stated in the third sentence of his September 11th speech that "Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror" and reinforced it eleven sentences later by explaining "Today our Nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature."

Another concept that is key to the nature of a conflict is what different types of acts mean – and what responses are appropriate for different types of acts. In 5 (4.54 %) sentences Bush characterized the nature of the September 11th attacks as tantamount to war and that the US would respond in kind [ACT OF WAR]. He established this frame at the end of the September

11th address to the nation when he declared that "America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism." This frame would next be repeated in his elegiac remarks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance service when he told a mourning nation that "War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder."

Once Bush defined the attacks as war, he proceeded to define the scope of the war on terror. In 19 (17.27 %) of the sentences, he defined it as a worldwide war in which no state could be neutral because every nation must declare its commitment to the US [WORLD WAR]. He translated this into policy terms by declaring that those who "harbored"internationally active terrorist groups would also be regarded as enemies (but did not specify what the US meant by "harbor"). Curiously, Bush began to propagate this frame before the act of war frame in the September 11th address to the nation when he starkly declared "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." Bush next reinforced this frame in his September 20th Address before a Joint Session of the Congress when he explained that the Taliban "…is not only repressing its own people; it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying the terrorists."

The next frames – America respects Islam, Global Threat and Total War – were established in Bush's September 20th Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress. America Respects Islam was the first frame established, though in an oblique way, in the September 20th speech. In that speech, Bush told the nation "We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers in English, Hebrew, and Arabic." This frame was vigorously reemphasized as Bush further explained, "The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam." In these establishing sentences and the others that reinforced, totaling 20 (18.18 %), Bush constructs a frame that tempers the earlier moral absolutism frame. The Respects Islam frame stresses that the war is not against Islam because the US respects its Muslim citizens and Muslims worldwide. Moreover, additional elements stress how the US aids Muslims, particularly the Afghani people. However, a third element in the respects Islam frame, which allows it to balance, rather than outrightly contradict the Moral Absolutism frame, is the subframe that Al-Qaida and the Taliban practice a perverse form of Islam.

The next frame Bush established in the September 20th speech was the Global Threat frame, which would total 12 or 3.7% of the four speech's total sentences. The Global threat frame, like the Respects Islam frame, consists of three elements: the terrorists have worldwide goals, they threaten targets and countries worldwide, and they operate internationally. Bush initially constructed the Global threat frame when he stated that Al-Qaida's goal "…is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere." He reinforces the Global Threat frame three sentences later by factually explaining that "This group and its leader, a person named Usama bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan." The Global Threat frame, as the earlier America respects Islam frame, is a tempering frame. By stressing the nature of the global threat, Bush gives international audiences a positive incentive to join the World war he declared. The positive incentive tempers the threatening, punitive language he

used to establish the intimidating World War frame, in which other countries are expected to immediately declare their allegiance, blood and treasure to Bush's still-forming game plan.

The final problem definition frame is the Total War frame. Wars are of different types and which means they can end in different ways. One type of war is total war that aims for the destruction of a combatant. However, there must be just cause for such an extreme war aim in order to cultivate international support. The just cause that lends credibility to this war aim is that the terrorist attacks ended a status quo peace. Restoration of peace under these circumstances can occur only by the terrorists' destruction. In the Total War frame, which is composed of 4 sentences, or 3.63 % of the total, Bush defines the only successful outcome for the war on terrorism as the total destruction of the terrorists. He establishes this part of the frame by decisively declaring that the war on terror "…will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." Bush joins the just cause to the war aim later in the Address to Congress when he vigorously declares "…the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows." The fusion is complete by the October 7th Address to the nation, in which Bush explains "In the face of today's new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it." Of all the problem defining frames, this one has the least face validity since the world, particularly the Middle East, was in a less than peaceful state prior to the September 11th attacks.

The next international references set consists of the response frames: The US leads the war on terrorism and World Supports US. The first response frame characterizes the US or presupposes it to be the natural leader of the war on terrorism. This frame is evident in each speech made after September 11th. This frame treats the US as proactive, but possibly at the expense of other countries' sovereignty. While a state may agree with the all the problem definition frames, they may disagree with how the US, in its self-designated leadership capacity, decides to prosecute the War on Terror. Of all the international reference frames, this one seems to be the most problematic for an international audience to accept.

The next response frame, World Support, tempers the US leads frame. In international politics, as in everyday life, supportiveness can take many forms. Support can range from expressions of sympathy to pledging forces. As this frame develops across the four speeches, Bush constructs foreign expressions of support as a permissive categorical resource for leading and prosecuting the war on terror. While these sentences make a priori claims about current world support, these sentences can also serve an international mobilizational purpose for cultivating additional foreign support, both at the interstate level as well as at the foreign domestic level. The analogy here is much as success attracts success, evidence of international support can attract additional support for a coalition in the war against terrorism that is led by the US.

These international frames, plus the domestic frame, capture 85.49 % of Bush's 324 sentences from these speeches.[3] While we believe these frame categories identify important

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[3] The following are examples of sentences classified as None of the Above and added to the Other category along with Congressional references and US Military references. 9/11: "The victims were in airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, business men and women, military and Federal workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbors." 9/14: "America is a nation full of good fortune, with so much to be grateful for." 9/20: "In the normal course of events,

features of problem definition and response, we also recognize that simply coding them into categories that reporters may choose to stress or ignore in their news stories misses an important dimension in foreign news reportage: reporters' judgments of newsworthiness. Below we discuss how we code for various elements operationalizing media practice to capture the effects of reporters' professional norms and organizational routines on the contents of their news stories.

Media Practice: Reporter Attentiveness to Crisis Facts, Political Decisions and Stylistic Rhetoric

One of the canons of the news writing is objectivity. Reporters strive to write factually correct stories that are impartial. Reporters are taught to include both sides and avoid intentional bias when they cover controversies in their news stories. However, achieving objectivity when addressing the factual is not always straightforward, as Paletz observes: "But even when [reporters] can [identify facts], they must still decide which facts to include and exclude, how prominently, and from which sources. These decisions inevitably impinge on objectivity" (2002: 65-66).

The surprise September 11th attacks and their aftermath created problems for factual reporting because of the difficulty in immediate travel, telecommunications, and general confusion. After the 11th, factual information about the attackers, the nature of their organization, and their capacities was scarce because of the multiple suspected groups, the classified nature of the intelligence on Al-Qaida, and the general lack of knowledge that occurs when a group wishes to keep its activities secret. As a result, there was much speculation but few hard facts. However, Bush made some factual statements in his speeches, particularly in his September 20th Address. Drawing from Paletz, noted above, it is reasonable to expect that reporters may be more attentive, and therefore more likely to recount, Bush's factual statements, given the stature of the president as a news source. The operational definition for coding a sentence as factual was: "A verifiable, empirical statement made by Bush in which he discloses quantities or characteristics of opponents or allies." We identified and coded 54 (16.66 %) sentences that were factual.

Most foreign policy crises are not a constant series of policy decisions; days or weeks may go by with little change in the nature of international interactions, or with stalemates, or a major event may precipitate sudden changes in the nature of the interactions. Communications scholar Mark Fishman found in his 1980 study that the media rely on demarcated events to make decisions about the newsworthiness of occurrences. Fishman explains that the press tends to treat events as narratives, in which news stories identify protagonists and antagonists in conflict and their actions linearly move the story to a new phase or stage. Timothy Cook's discussion of the Fishman study notes that if these two criteria are not present, "...journalists tend to conclude that "nothing happened" and therefore there is no news..." and adds that "[i]f journalists do not consider something to be newsworthy by their own criteria for judgment, a source's power may not be enough to get it in print or on the air" (1998: 90). Whether the media perceive a policy decision as fitting the antagonist vs. protagonist narrative form may affect what and the extent to which the media recount a given sentence. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to code for whether

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Presidents come to this Chamber to report on the state of the Union," "Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity." 10/7: "Initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places."

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a sentence was a policy decision or not, distinguishing between international policy decisions and domestic policy decisions. The operational definition used for identifying a policy statement was "a statement made in which Bush discloses actions or the purposes of actions taken or to be taken by the US government." We identified and coded 35 (10.8 %) international decision sentences and 18 (5.5%) domestic decision sentences.

In addition to expecting reporters to be especially attentive to, and thus more likely to recount, speech sentences that are factual and that disclose decisions, we also expect reporters to be more attentive to sentences that are highly stylistic in nature. Reporters make their living trading in words and words that are well-put together are likely to stand out in their eyes. Moreover, there is some degree of competition among reporters at a newspaper for story space. It seems reasonable to expect that editors, if faced with having to choose between stories on the same subject, will choose the story more appealing to audiences. Stories quoting the stylistic flourishes of leaders are more likely to appeal to mass readerships. To test this conjecture, we identified all sentences that were metaphorical in structure. The operational definition for coding metaphorical sentences was "applying a word or phrase to an object or concept that it does not literally denote." We identified and coded 38 (11.72) metaphorical sentences. Examples of such sentences include "These acts shattered steel but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve," "This nation is peaceful but fierce when stirred to anger," "Freedom and fear are at war," and "They will take that lonely path at their own peril."

Coding News Stories

For this study we targeted five national news papers:

1. The New York Times (US) – 32 stories
2. The Times, London (UK) – 31 stories
3. The Globe & Mail (Canada) – 22 stories
4. Le Monde (France) – 14 stories
5. The Irish Times (Ireland) – 25 stories

The news stories we content-analyzed had to (1) paraphrase or quote a statement disclosed in a targeted speech and attribute them to the president and (2) do so within a three day span of time (three days after the speech was given). We obtained both news stories and editorials from Lexis-Nexis and other database key word searches. Stories were identified using "White House," "president," and "Bush" in key word searches.

One hundred and twenty-four stories were analyzed for this study and 1, 979 instances of recounted sentences were coded. Of the124 stories, some were verbatim transcripts. This is a study of different factors' effects on reporters' selective attentiveness to presidential frames. Since news stories that are published transcripts will, by definition, include recounts of all speech sentences, transcripts will directly affect our measures of the dependent variables. On the other hand, the decision to publish a transcript is an editorial decision that is not made for every speech, suggesting the occasion of that particular speech makes it more newsworthy than other speeches. Frensley addressed the transcript dilemma in earlier studies by creating a dummy

control variable, "transcript." Following earlier coding convention, if a decision statement was recounted in a verbatim transcript it was coded 1, otherwise 0.

The speech sentence is key for constructing the dependent variable, "recounted sentences." If a given paper recounted a sentence, that sentence's cell in the paper's "recounts" column was coded as 1, 0 if ignored. The dependent variable "recounted sentences" was obtained by summing the recounts across the papers news stories to produce an interval level variable.

A final modeling issue stems from exhaustive coding of all the sentences into frame categories. With exhaustive coding it is necessary to exclude one or several categories, to serve as the baseline comparison for assessing the effects of the test categories. There are no statistical rules for deciding which category to choose as the baseline, instead, baseline choices are made for theoretical reasons (Hardy, 1993). Our theoretical interest in this paper is the extent to which national presses differently reported Bush's international frames and our argument is that securitization theory's default position, that these presses similarly mirrored Bush's representations of the crisis and justifications of the response, does not accord media actors agency. We compiled a composite domestic frame variable and exclude it as well as sentences coded in the Other and None categories. These serve as our baseline categories. Since the dummy regression results of the test variables are comparisons of their means against the baseline's means (domestic frames, Other and None), if securitization theory's default position is correct, the national presses should mirror all categories of frames, resulting in no significant parameter estimates for the international frames. Hence, we feel justified in making the frames in the Domestic, Other and None categories the baselines. Below we present the results of the Chi-Square distributions and OLS regressions.

Results

A first cut at examining differences between Bush's framing and media conveyance of those frames is to look at the differences between their proportions. Taking the proportional differences between Bush's frame categories and treating them as the expected observations, Chi-square distributions were calculated to determine the extent to which the media's proportions of recounted frames differed from what would be expected. Table 2 summarizes the results.

Table 2 about here.

Table 2 reports interesting differences between the proportions of the frames Bush constructed in his speeches and those that reporters carried over in their coverage. Of the five national presses we analyzed, three proportionally conveyed Bush's frames: The New York Times, the London Times and the Irish Times. France's Le Monde and Canada's Globe & Mail covered Bush's frames disproportionately. These descriptive statistics suggest that the journalistic expectation that Bush would dominate overseas discourse across the board is problematic. Moreover, it suggests that Bush's securitization attempt was heard and understood in different ways in different countries because of media coverage.

However, these results are from only descriptive, not explanatory analyses. These results cannot tell us what frames are significant after controlling for media practice factors, if any, nor can they tell us what international frames remain significant after the effects of the others are controlled. We ran regression analyses of the effects of international frames, media practice factors (fact, domestic decision, international decision, and metaphor) and controlled for transcripts (where appropriate) on speech sentences recounted by each of the five papers. Note that with the interval count nature of the dependent variable, Recounted Sentences, sentence recounts can vary between 0 and, in theory, infinity but in practice ranged up to nine. Consequently, the independent variables are being regressed on the extent to which a news paper recounted a particular coded sentence. This will permit not only determining which international frame(s) had the most effect on news story recounting, but also if media variable effects had greater strength in determining what sentences reporters chose to recount. Table 3 summarizes the results.

Table 3 about here.

Table 3 reports the unstandardized coefficients, the standard error, significance level for each coefficient, and the adjusted R-squared for each model. The first item to note is the adjusted R-squared for each regression. This model performed well for explaining the variance in each national paper's recounting patterns of Bush's speeches. Adjusted R-squared percentages range from a modest but acceptable 18 % for the London Times to a much more robust 43 % for the Irish Times, and 35 % for the New York Times, 33 % for the Globe & Mail, and 37% for Le Monde. Low condition indices revealed no multicollinearity.

The second set of items of interest center on the similarities across the five regressions. First, all of the significant coefficients are positive with the exception of one for Le Monde, and every regression produced significant estimates for both International Frame variables and Media Factor variables.

Note the four media factors variables. The coefficients for international decision, are significant and positive across all newspapers. These results confirm the importance of a central proposition in selective media conveyance framing: reporters respond and react to leader framing within the constraints of their professional norms and procedures. However, this same pattern is not evident for the effects of Domestic decision. While one might expect that European and Canadian papers would be less interested in US domestic decisions, this factor's lack of effect on New York Times recounting is surprising, given that it is the US paper of record. As to this finding, we can only speculate. Perhaps the New York Times regarded itself as part of a national press division of labor, with its main task to cover the international, rather than domestic decisions.

Interestingly, the effect of a factual sentence was significant only for the New York Times and the London Times, and the effect of a metaphorical sentence was significant for all but Le Monde. We return to this finding below, when we interpret comparisons of explanatory magnitude between and within international frame and media factors.

Where the effects of the media factor variables suggest more similarities than differences (though the differences that are apparent are important), the effects of the international frame variables differ greatly across these presses.

All five papers were identical in the insignificant effects sentences Bush framed as Terrorists attacked Freedom, terrorists pose a Global Threat, and the terrorist attacks were an Act of War had on all newspapers' recountings. In other words, sentences framed in these ways were proportionally recounted. Consequently, the contributions press coverage made to the parameters of possible political discourse about President's Bush public reactions to the September 11th attacks tended not to emphasize Bush's preferred constructions of terrorists' motive and tempering and balancing of the World War frame's punitive language beyond what he and his speech writers did in the texts of his public addresses.

Instead of Global Threat's tempering effect, the World War and Moral Absolutism frames were disproportionately conveyed and repeated in four of the five and three out of the five national presses, respectively. Ireland was the only country in which World War was not a disproportionate share of the national press's contribution to political discourse. That the World War frame had no significant effect on Irish Times recounting patterns is interesting and, upon closer examination, corroborates our expectation that conveyance will occur but, contra Applebaum's journalism perspective, it will vary across national media systems.

The World War frame declares that states cannot be neutral in the War on terrorism and that the US would regard those who harbored terrorists as enemies. The Republic of Ireland has long been involved in attempting to settle the Northern Irish conflict. While certainly not a harborer of the Provisional IRA, it has in the past often called for its political arm to be a part of any settlement talks. What seems to explain why the Irish Times was the only national press to not disproportionately propagate Bush's World War frame is that Richard Haas, the US special envoy, was in Northern Ireland at the time, attempting to prevent the collapse of the power-sharing executive that the latest settlement attempt established. Irish Times news stories "side-stepped" the global nature of the World War frame by specifically addressing the local impact of it in Northern Ireland, where the Provisional IRA was refusing to disarm in accordance with the settlement agreement. Consequently, instead of reporters writing stories about the global import of the World War frame, the Irish Times ran stories about its localized impact in Northern Ireland and, since Haas was on-site, those stories focused on his statements. Rather than undermining the concept of selective media conveyance, the regression estimates for the Irish Times show how securitizations that are global in scope are going to be conveyed by national presses to public audiences by stories that, when appropriate, will view them through local lenses.

Significantly negative results for Total War only in Le Monde (with no positive significant effect for any other national press), significantly positive results for Respects Islam in only two out the five, for US Leader in one out of the five, and for World Support for only two out of the five corroborates our expectations that the media did not passively, indifferently and proportionately convey Bush's securitizing frames of the war on terrorism.

However, it may be that there is more similarity than meets the eye in Table 4 due to possible similar relative frame strengths on recounting extent. To determine if this true, we examined the beta weights to determine the relative importance of the independent variables, including the international frame variables. We can do this by comparing the beta weights because the ratio of the beta weights is the ratio of the predictive importance of the independent variables in the model. Table 5 indicates the rankings of the beta weights for each significant coefficient in each model.

Table 5 about here.

Note the rankings for World War. Recall that this coefficient had a significant effect on recount extent in four papers. Of those four, in only the London Times did World War have the most importance among the international frame variables, relative to the given model in explaining variation in recounted sentences. In two presses out of the four (Le Monde and Globe & Mail), did World War rank second in importance among the international frame variables that were significant in effect, relative to the given model. In the newspapers in which World War had significant effect, there was no correspondence it being the primary international frame variable for predictive importance.

A far different pattern emerges for Moral Absolutism, the second frame that had the most shared effect on national presses. In the three presses in which it had a significant effect on recount extent (New York Times, London Times, and Le Monde), Moral Absolutism shared third ranking of importance among the international frame variables. No other pattern of rankings, either in terms of a frame accounting for significant effects in recounting across national presses or for a frame accounting for primary explanatory value within a given model is discernable.

Our different analyses of chi-square distributions, regression estimations, and beta weight comparisons all suggest that national presses did not passively convey all of Bush's securitizing problem representations. The national presses only conveyed the Freedom, Act of War, and Global threat proportionate to the extent Bush invoked them in his speeches. The other problem representation frames were disproportionately conveyed, with Total War disproportionately under-conveyed by Le Monde. The two response justification frames appear to be more proportionately conveyed as a class, but differences between the national presses are evident. US Leader was proportionately conveyed by all but Le Monde and World Support was disproportionately conveyed by the London Times and the Globe & Mail. Moreover, we found that various types of media factors affected whether a given sentence would be recounted by a national press, across all presses. These findings suggest that the role the media plays in determining the agenda of public discourse about securitizations will be partly determined by media actors' organizational routines and professional norms and less by a vision of providing a free market of ideas and arguments. Below, we discuss the implications of these findings for securitization theory.

Conclusion: Constructivism's Need to Engage Mass Communication on its own Terms

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In this study we showed that the national papers of four US allies varied in the extent to which they representatively conveyed President Bush's September 11th frames in news coverage of his speeches. That we find significant differences in press coverage across these four states is important for a securitization explanation about international reaction to the US representation of and response to the September 11th attacks. The ability for societal actors, including media actors, to differently represent and understand an event is an important pre-condition for linkage between speaker-centered speech act theory to argument and dialogue among wider audiences. Our results show that, contrary to the journalistic perspective and securitization's present default position of a passively conveying media, differences between national presses provided for their readerships the bases for wider societal argument and dialogue to emerge among these historical allies, even during the first extraordinary days after the extraordinary magnitude of these attacks.

Moreover, comparisons across the models of magnitude differences in media factors estimates versus international frames parameter estimates underscore the importance of Shaw's insights into how scholarship should proceed to understand the mass media as an international actor. Shaw argues the necessity of understanding the media as a two-sided actor: it not only structures a communications sphere in which other international actors interact but it is also an actor constrained by its own organizational routines, norms, and practices. Our regression results corroborate this in every case with at least one media factor variable explaining some of the variance in speech sentences that were recounted, even when controlling for the effects of Bush's international frames.

At this point in securitization's theoretical development, its omission of considerations of both medium and media actors limit securitization analysis of linkage between speech acts and legitimizing discourse and analysis of linkage between two or more securitizations. Attention to these considerations can overcome these limitations. First, our findings on differences in ally national press coverage provide insights on how completely media convey leaders' speech act representations, which will affect the scope of topics of legitimizing discourse. Second, our analysis of national press coverage of Bush's representations of the War on Terrorism, compared with the later historical record, suggest that the national presses may have played a role in shaping public opinion. We speculate that these publics' mediated opinions created domestic political constraints that affected European and Canadian leaders' subsequent decisions to securitize or not the Iraq invasion phase in the war against terror. [Discuss BRockriede and Ehninger]. While we limit our discussion on this point to only speculation, we do offer a basis to pursue the role and effects of media actors in linking securitizations.

Above we discussed how William's criticism of securitization's singular focus on the speech act, without considering other components of communication – especially the nature of the communication medium and the institutional nature of the actor controlling that medium -- prevents development of linkage models of international interactions and state-societal interactions. In the absence of understandings of linkage, as David (2000) puts it, constructivism's positive contribution to security studies to date is limited to advancing the argument that it is possible to redefine behavioral norms in international security relationships. While this argument is an important insight – and crucial for the conflict resolution and peace settlement side of security studies – remaining indifferent to the nature and functions of other actors involved in the larger sociological process of diffusing those redefined behavioral norms

results in internal contradiction. If securitization is to achieve its practical ethical goal of fostering argumentative [reason-based] deliberation by wider societal audiences in place of instrumental manipulation of those audiences by administrations and foreign policy bureaucracies, then it must examine how well media actors – constrained by their own institutionalized norms and routines – perform in structuring the communicative sphere required for that deliberation. Continuing failure to examine mass communication's role and effects means that the constructivist program continues to only raise a straw man against which to criticize other approaches to security.

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Table 1. International Frames in Bush's 9/11, 9/14, 9/20 and 10/7 speeches

Frame and Description		Example
Freedom: Terrorists' hatred of freedom and democracy motivated the 9/11 attacks.	9/11	America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.
	9/14	They have attacked America because we are freedom's home and defender.
	9/20	All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.
	10/7	The name of today's military operation is Enduring Freedom.
Act of War: The nature, magnitude, and peacetime attacks against the US are tantamount to war.	9/11	America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.
	9/14	War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder.
	9/20	Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there.
	10/7	The battle is now joined on many fronts.
GlobalThreat: The terrorists have worldwide goals, threaten targets and countries worldwide, and operate internationally.	9/11	-----
	9/14	-----
	9/20	They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next.
	10/7	-----
Moral Absolutism: The war has no middle ground; it is a struggle between the progressive and traditional or between good and evil.	9/11	Today our Nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature.
	9/14	-----
	9/20	This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.
	10/7	By destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans.
World War: States cannot be neutral; every nation must declare its support to the US. Harborers of terrorists are enemies.	9/11	We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.
	9/14	-----
	9/20	Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.
	10/7	If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves.

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Frame and Description (con't)		Example
Total War: Terrorist attacks ended world peace; restoration of peace occurs only by their destruction.	9/11	-----
	9/14	-----
	9/20	But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.
	10/7	In the face of today's new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.
Respects Islam: The war is not on Islam; US respects Muslims worldwide; Al-Qaida and Taliban practice perverted form of Islam. America helps the Afghani people.	9/11	-----
	9/14	-----
	9/20	The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.
	10/7	The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and we are the friends of almost a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith.
US leader: The US is the natural/presumed leader in the war on terrorism; it is the US mission to lead.	9/11	-----
	9/14	But our responsibility to history is already clear: To answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.
	9/20	We ask every nation to join us.
	10/7	We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfill it.
World support: The world, groups of countries, and individual countries support and sympathize with the US.	9/11	And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance.
	9/14	And this unity against terror is now extending across the world.
	9/20	We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.
	10/7	Other close friends, including Canada, Australia, Germany, and France, have pledged forces as the operation unfolds.

Table 2: Bush Speeches' International Frames and News Paper Recounts by Frequency and (Percent). *** denotes significance at the .05 level**

Frame	Bush	NYT (US)	LT (UK)	G&M (CAN)	LM (FR)	IT (IRE)
Freedom	10 (9.09)	14 (8.38)	10 (6.13)	**2 (2.12)**	**2 (2.70)**	3 (4.47)
Act of War	5 (4.54)	8 (4.79)	7 (4.29)	**1 (1.06)**	**2 (2.70)**	3 (4.47)
Global Threat	16 (14.54)	20 (11.97)	19 (11.65)	**2 (2.12)**	**2 (2.70)**	2 (2.98)
Moral Absolute	12 (10.90)	26 (15.56)	21 (12.88)	**2 (2.12)**	**11 (14.86)**	6 (8.95)
World War	19 (17.27)	37 (22.15)	34 (20.85)	**31 (32.97)**	**33 (44.59)**	19 (28.35)
Total War	4 (3.63)	6 (3.59)	7 (4.29)	**3 (3.19)**	**1 (1.35)**	3 (4.47)
Respects Islam	20 (18.18)	30 (17.96)	26 (15.95)	**15 (15.95)**	**9 (12.16)**	13 (19.40)
US leader	7 (6.36)	8 (4.79)	9 (5.52)	**3 (3.19)**	**6 (8.10)**	6 (8.95)
World Support	17 (15.45)	18 (10.77)	30 (18.40)	**35 (37.23)**	**8 (10.81)**	12 (17.91)
Totals:	110	167	163	**94**	**74**	67
Chi-square (df=8; .05>15.5)	9.51	6.06	**68.19***	**47.97***	13.88	

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Table 3: OLS Estimates of International Frames and Media Factors on Sentences Recounted from Bush's post-9/11 speeches

Variable		NY Times	London Times	Globe & Mail	Le Monde	Irish Times
Int'l Frames	Freedom	-.003 (.284)	-.214 (.217)	.001 (.254)	.000 (.228)	-.001 (.185)
	Act of War	.494 (.394)	.234 (.301)	-.005 (.353)	-.104 (.317)	.007 (.258)
	Global Threat	-.002 (.237)	-.111 (.181)	-.004 (.211)	-.110 (.189)	-.004 (.154)
	Moral Absolutism	.879*** (.258)	.550** (.197)	-.009 (.232)	.470** (.208)	-.001 (.169)
	World War	.612** (.222)	.451** (.170)	1.16*** (.199)	.760*** (.178)	-.113 (.148)
	Total War	.272 (.444)	.460 (.339)	.326 (.398)	-.681* (.358)	-.399 (.293)
	Respects Islam	.294 (.211)	.000 (.162)	.526** (.188)	.007 (.169)	.237* (.138)
	US leader	-.003 (.334)	.003 (.256)	.195 (.299)	.451* (.269)	.119 (.221)
	World Support	-.003 (.226)	.440** (.174)	1.83*** (.202)	.242 (.182)	.238 (.149)
Media Factors	Fact	-.271* (.142)	.238** (.109)	.130 (.128)	.006 (.115)	-.002 (.093)
	Domestic Decision	.289 (.216)	-.196 (.167)	.004 (.192)	.189 (.173)	.008 (.141)
	Internat'l Decision	.605*** (.172)	.251* (.132)	.647*** (.153)	1.47*** (.137)	1.07*** (.112)
	Metaphor	.561*** (.153)	.324** (.117)	.281** (.137)	-.000 (.123)	.302** (.100)
Control	transcript	1.140*** (.105)	.481*** (.101)	N/A	N/A	.980*** (.091)
Constant		.356*** (.093)	.683*** (.088)	.101 (.062)	.196** (.056)	.122** (.047)
Adj. R-squared		.35	.18	.33	.37	.43

*** p< or = .001; ** p< or = .05; * p< or = .1

Table 5: Beta weight rankings of significant coefficients affecting news story recounts of Bush's September 11 speeches

Variable		NY Times	London Times	Globe & Mail	Le Monde	Irish Times
Int'l Frames	Free-dom					
	Act of War					
	Global Threat					
	Moral Absolute	3	3		3	
	World War	4	1	2	2	
	Total War				4	
	Respects Islam			4		3
	US leader				5	
	World Support		4	1		
Media Factors	Fact	5	5			
	Domestic Decision					
	Internat'l Decision	1	6	3	1	1
	Metaphor	2	2	5		2